

SUBMISSION OF THE
ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION
TO THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
SAFETY BOARD

AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 383
Chicago O'Hare
International Airport
Chicago, IL, USA
28 October 2016

NTSB DCA17FA021

In accordance with 49 CFR 831.14, the Allied Pilots Association (APA) a designated Party to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation of the accident, respectfully submits to the Board its findings and recommendations.

Communication with respect to this submission may be addressed to:

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National Safety Committee
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On October 28, 2016, at about 1432 CDT, American Airlines flight number 383, a Boeing B767-300, N345AN, powered by two General Electric CF6-80C2B6 turbofan engines, experienced a right engine uncontained failure and subsequent fire during the takeoff ground roll on runway 28R at the Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD), Chicago, Illinois. The flight crew aborted the takeoff and stopped the aircraft on runway 28R and an emergency evacuation was conducted. Of the 161 passengers and 9 crew members onboard, one passenger received serious injuries during the evacuation and the airplane was substantially damaged as a result of the fire. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a domestic scheduled passenger flight from ORD to Miami International Airport (MIA), Miami, Florida.

ALLIED PILOTS ASSOCIATION'S ROLE IN THE INVESTIGATION

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is leading the investigation into AA Flight 383's uncontained engine failure, subsequent fire during the aborted takeoff, and the unplanned emergency evacuation.

As a party in this investigation, the Allied Pilots Association's (APA) role is to participate in this investigation.

The NTSB requested that all parties submit proposed findings drawn from the evidence revealed during the course of the investigation.

APA has responded to the NTSB's request with this document, which:

- Identifies findings and recommendations from the factual evidence in the investigation.
- Offers a conclusion and recommendation based on findings and analyses.

PROBABLE CAUSE

APA believes that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the GE CF6-80C2B6 stage two high-pressure turbine disk on the right engine.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

APA's assessment of the evidence is based upon observations of the aircraft, accident site, post-accident examination of aircraft systems and components, the air carrier's maintenance records, log book, and manuals, Boeing flight operational manuals, flight data recorder (FDR) data, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, and flight crew interviews.

OPERATIONAL FACTORS/ HUMAN PERFORMANCE GROUP

Findings

1. The Captain was unaware that an emergency evacuation had been initiated by the flight attendants/passengers.
2. When the flight deck began the Evacuation checklist, the evacuation of the passengers was already in progress.
3. Due to the Evacuation checklist being started after the flight attendants/passengers were already in the process of evacuating, the left engine was still running in idle.
4. The Evacuation checklist, as it is written, is most effective when initiated by the flight deck.

Recommendations

Based on these findings, APA recommends:

1. Improve communication between the cabin and the flight deck during the initiation of an evacuation by the flight attendants, to include any and all means necessary. In addition, if positive interphone communication from the flight attendants to the flight deck concerning a self-initiated evacuation is not an option, then possibly a flight attendant yelling through the cockpit door would be appropriate.
2. In the event of a flight attendant having to make an emergency interphone call, improve the display of the code so it is easier for the flight attendant to call the flight deck.
3. The required cabin crew briefing between the Captain and the FA 1/A-FA/Purser should also include a reminder to confirm the appropriate emergency interphone call code for that particular aircraft.
4. The Evacuation checklist should allow for the contingency that an evacuation from the aircraft was initiated by the flight attendants. This would improve the efficacy of the Evacuation checklist which could result in the remaining operating engine being shut down sooner.

APA ACTIONS

APA stands ready, willing and able to assist AA, the FAA, Boeing, APFA, and the NTSB with respect to incorporating any safety enhancements or recommendations that will prevent future injuries during emergency evacuations.

CONCLUSION

APA has stated findings and recommendations that we believe address those areas found to be causal or contributing factors to this accident. We remain confident that the NTSB will determine the probable cause consistent with our findings and put forth the appropriate conclusion and recommendations.